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The issue has a particular relevance 
to the subject of performance evalu-
ation within an organisation, whether 
that organisation is commercial, aca-
demic, public sector and even not-for-
profit. Most people's experience of the 
ordeal that is an annual performance 
assessment, however, will likely be in 
the commercial world. 
In a commercial situation, an indi-
vidual's performance in achieving or 
failing to achieve certain targets such 
as sales, profitability, customer satis-
faction, customer retention and staff 
satisfaction against a clear set of met-
rics is arguably relatively easily meas-
urable. In many cases, the numbers 
will tell their own story, but neverthe-
less managers often need to subjec-
tively determine an overall employee 
rating based on these objective perfor-
mance measures.  
One complicating feature in the de-
termination of this rating is the role 
that the personal costs to a manager 
play in delivering, or not delivering, an 
accurate performance rating. From the 
employing organisation's perspective, 
a fair and accurate rating is undoubt-
edly good in terms of motivating em-
ployees to work hard in the year ahead. 
The problem is that, as our research 
demonstrates, it might not be in a 
manager's interest to provide a rating 
that can be truly regarded as accurate.
How can this be so? It is a recur-
ring quirk of human nature that in 
most fields of activity people think of 
themselves as above average. In every-
day working life very few will readily ac-
cept that they have performed poorly. 
If only to preserve their own inflated 
ego, people labelled as poor perform-
ers will tend to attribute underper-
formance to external circumstances, 
over which, of course, they have had 
little or no control. 
A fine recent example of this phe-
nomenon can be found in the many 
reactions to the UK electorate's vote 
to leave the European Union. So-called 
Brexit has been seized upon as an ex-
cuse for a broad spectrum of under-
performance, from the dramatic slide 
in the pound sterling in the imme-
diate aftermath of the vote to a se-
ries of stutters in the UK's domestic 
housing market.
Awkward scenarios
Returning to our research, we found 
that if a manager identified an employ-
ee as a poor performer, perhaps even a 
terrible performer, then the delivery of 
an accurate rating would reflect upon 
the manager's own poor performance 
and rating. Moreover, there would like-
ly be other consequences, such as con-
frontation with a disgruntled employ-
ee, possibly resulting in an awkward 
appeal to a third party against the rat-
ing. Even if the manager is subsequent-
ly found to have awarded an appropri-
ate rating, a formal investigation will 
have generated costs in terms of time, 
effort and emotion. In short, the man-
ager will have experienced unwanted 
distraction, inconvenience and anxiety.
In a live work environment, what 
might the consequences be? We found 
that managers faced with such a po-
tentially awkward scenario could be 
tempted to compress performance 
ratings; that is, reduce the spread 
between the poor ratings and the 
good ones. 
While very good performers will 
continue to be designated as very 
good, and good deemed to be good, 
poor performers could be labelled as 
average. This is a bad thing, as the 
resultant artificial inflation of perfor-
mance ratings does no one any good. 
The employee concerned will inevita-
bly have a false sense of worth and 
therefore will see no reason to make 
The accuracy of information available to managers about an employ-
ee's performance, combined with the transparency of performance 
evaluations based on that information, can help to motivate man-
agers to reward good performance and highlight poor performance.
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ings and rewards compare to those 
of their peers. Stronger performers 
will likely be disgruntled and demo-
tivated when ratings are compressed 
because under a transparent system 
it is clear that their performance is 
relatively undervalued. 
Because it is more important to 
keep stronger performers satisfied 
than weaker performers satisfied, 
managers will tend to differentiate rat-
ings as a result, ie, the difference be-
tween ratings and rewards assigned to 
the stronger performer and the weaker 
performer is significantly larger when 
both information accuracy and out-
come transparency are relatively high.
In conclusion, being accurate, open 
and honest will help to deliver an out-
come that more closely resembles an 
accurate rating. Rather than relying on 
inaccurate information and opacity, 
this promotes the organisational de-
velopment of human capital and drives 
long-term performance. 
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hard to achieve a good result. 
In such a situation, the supervising 
manager will likely give the employee 
the benefit of the doubt, leading to 
an inflated rating relative to what the 
performance indicators would warrant. 
When performance information is very 
accurate, the performance indicators 
tell a clear story whether the employ-
ee worked hard or not and there is no 
need to “err on the safe side”.
However, when there is no trans-
parency about employee evaluations 
and rewards, rating decisions are not 
fundamentally changed by an increase 
in the accuracy of information. In other 
words, as long as employees cannot 
observe each other's ratings and re-
wards, managers can still avoid certain 
personal discomfort by providing all 
employees with evaluation outcomes 
that do not necessarily tell the truth.
When employees can observe each 
other's ratings and performance, 
their satisfaction with evaluations will 
also depend on how their own rat-
an effort to improve performance; the 
employing organisation will equally in-
evitably suffer as a result of what is in 
effect a dishonest assessment.
Control system elements
What can an organisation do to ad-
dress this problem? We suggest two 
specific control system elements that 
can combine to affect performance 
evaluations. The first is the accuracy 
of information about an employee's 
efforts. The second is organisational 
transparency about performance eval-
uation outcomes such as the ratings 
awarded and rewards promised.
When performance information 
is not accurate, supervising manag-
ers cannot be certain that poor per-
formance manifested in the objective 
performance measures is in fact due 
to poor performance of the employee. 
For instance, if the customer flow in a 
region is highly volatile, then there may 
be times in which revenues come in low 
even though the employee worked 
